Liability of Third Parties under the Ohio Workmen\u27s Compensation Act by Levine, Herbert B.
Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 5 | Issue 1
1953
Liability of Third Parties under the Ohio
Workmen's Compensation Act
Herbert B. Levine
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of
Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation




In a field as volatile as labor law it is difficult to draw unchanging con-
dusions. However, it appears settled that an "alter ego" may not under any
circumstances, avoid the statutory duties of its predecessor. Apparently an
"alter ego" is also bound by a contract made by its predecessor with the
union. It also appears clear that a bona fide purchaser for value will be
held liable for the statutory duties of its predecessor. Until the courts de-
cide otherwise the Board will probably continue finding notice of a union
contract to the successor bona fide purchaser from the most meager of cir-
cumstances to enforce statutory duties. However, it is highly questionable
whether contractual duties will be charged to a bona fide purchaser in the
absence of an express assumption. The question of "what is the disposition
of the contract" has been given little consideration by the courts.
As to relocation of industry two problems remain unsolved. The
first is whether the union employee may claim transportation costs to the
new location, and second, what circumstances must be present before the
Board will order a company to return to its original location.
The Board's attitude toward removing employers is apparently more
sympathetic than in the early days of the Board's existence. This is probably
due to the increased complexity of motives in the relocation of a business
due to postwar conditions.
HAROLD L TIcKnN
Liability of Third Parties Under the Ohio
Workmen's Compensation Act
MOST CASES that arise under the Workmen's Compensation Acts in-
volve disputes between an employee and his employer or the insurer. Not
infrequently, however, an employee, while working within the scope of his
employment, is injured by the tortious act of someone other than himself or
his employer, %.e., a third person. For example, if an employee of a highway
construction company is repairing a road and while so working is struck
and injured by a motorist driving along the highway, several legal disputes
may arise. These will be governed by the Workmen's Compensation Act of
the particular state involved. As the Workmen's Compensation Acts of
the several states contain greatly varying provisions, the scope of this article
is limited to a discussion of the problems that have arisen under the Ohio
Act only and to only the liability of the person whose tortious conduct in-
'OHIo REV. CODE §§ 4123.01 to 4123.99 (OHIO GEN. CODE §§ 1465-4 1a to
1465-113).
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jured the employee.2 It is assumed throughout the article that the em-
ployee has the right to receive workmen's compensation from his employer.
Contrary to most states,3 there is no provision in the Ohio Act dealing
with the liability of the third person. Section 35 of Article II of the Ohio
Constitution, which provides that workmen's" compensation shall be in
lieu of all other rights to compensation, or damages, for such death, in-
juries, or occupational disease , " affords no help since the action at law
that was therein abrogated has been construed to be the action that existed in
favor of the employee against his own employer. 4 Hence, the law concern-
ing the liability of third parties that has been evolved in Ohio is case law, al-
though the courts have placed reliance on the spirit of the Act.
The first major problem which arises is whether the injured employee,
having received workman's compensation for his injury, can nevertheless
recover damages from the third person whose negligence caused the injury.
The first supreme court case to deal with this problem was Trumbull Cliffs
Furnace Co. v. Shachovsky.5 In that case an independent contractor was
performing some work for the defendant, and the plaintiff, one of the em-
ployees of the independent contractor, was injured by the defendant's negli-
gence. When sued for personal injuries the defendant claimed as a defense
that both the independent contractor and the defendant had complied with
'The question of whether the third person has any rights as against the employer of
the injured workman arose in Bankers Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Cleveland Hardware &
Forging Co., 77 Ohio App. 121, 62 N.E.2d 180, app. dismissed, 145 Ohio St. 615,
62 N.E.2d 251 (1945) In this case a seller negligently furnished oxygen instead
of nitrogen which the defendant, the purchaser, had ordered. The defendant negli-
gently allowed its employees to use such gas, resulting in an explosion and the deaths
of the employees. The latter s dependents collected workmen s compensation from
their employer, the defendant-purchaser. The dependents then sued the plaintiff's
assured, the seller, for negligence, and the plaintiff, because of its insurance contract
with the seller, settled such actions. The plaintiff then sued the defendant to re-
cover the amount paid on settlement, on the theory that the defendant's negligence
was the primary cause of the employees death and that the seller, the third person,
was only secondarily liable. The court held that there was no question of primary
and secondary liability involved, and that an employer complying with the Work-
men s Compensation Act is relieved of any common law liability because of injuries
befalling his employees; hence the third person seller, through its insurer, cannot
recover.
' "Compensation Acts may be divided into three general classes with respect to
remedies against negligent third persons: first, those which have no provision in the
Act relating thereto; second, those which have such provision but do not differentiate
between third persons under the Act and not under the Act; and third, those which
make the latter differentiation." 3 SCHNEIDER, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 176
(3d ed. 1943) For a general discussion of the employees rights against third per-
sons under the different types of statutes before and after collecting workmen s com-
pensation, see 3 SCHNEIDER, op. cit. sutpra at 180 and HOROVITZ, WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION 342-344 (1944)
'Ohio Pub. Service Co. v. Sharkey, 117 Ohio St. 586, 160 N.E. 687 (1927)
* 111 Ohio St. 791, 146 N.E. 306 (1924)
NOTES
the Workmen's Compensation Act, and the employee had applied for and
received compensation under the Act. The court, however, held that under
Ohio Revised Code Section 4123.01 (Ohio General Code Section 1465-
61) ' the defendant was not the employer of the injured employee but rather
a third person, and the employee, even though he had accepted compensa-
tion, could recover in a common law tort action.
The court unplied that if the independent contractor employer had failed
to comply with the Act, its injured employee could elect to treat the gen-
eral contractor as a statutory employer under the above section who may
be liable to respond under the act, or as a third person who is not protected
by the Act. It is also implicit in the decision that the employee need not
elect beforehand between accepting compensation and suing the third
person. He can recover compensation even though he has already recovered
from the third person.7 The doctrine established by this case, that the in-
jured employee can recover from the third person tortfeasor even though
the third person is another employer complying with the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act, has been fully borne out in other Ohio cases.8 In Harbruck -V.
Burger Iron Co.,9 it was held that the employee can recover from the negli-
gent third person even though the third person and the injured man's em-
ployer were engaged at the time in a common enterprise and the injury was
caused in the prosecution of such enterprise. The court held that the latter
fact " would make no difference so long as the circumstances are not
such as to create the relation of master and servant between the party sued
and the injured party." 0
Since the suit between the employee and the third person is for personal
6
"Every person in the service of any independent contractor or subcontractor who
has failed to [comply with the Act] shall be considered as the employee of
the person who has entered into a contract with such independent contractor un-
less such employees, or their legal representatives or beneficiaries elect, after death
or injury, to regard such independent contractor as the employer."
TCf. Vayto v. River Terminal & Ry. 18 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 305, 28 Ohio Dec. 401
(Cuyahoga Com. Pl. 1915), where it was held that the employee's right to receive
compensation is not lost by reason of his settlement with the third person tortfeasor.
'George v. Youngstown, 139 Ohio St. 591, 41 N.E.2d 567 (1942); Ohio Pub. Ser-
vice Co. v. Sharkey, 117 Ohio St. 586, 160 N.E. 687 (1927); Kasunic v. Euclid East
Seventeenth Street Co., 32 Ohio L. Rep. 261 (Ohio App. 1929); Arnold v. Ohio
Gas & Elec. Co., 28 Ohio App. 435, 162 N.E. 765 (1928); Ohio Traction Co. v.
Washington, 6 Ohio App. 273 (1916); Luthy v. Cincinnati, N.Y. & Tex. P. Ry., 2
Ohio L. Abs. 207 (Cincinnati Super. Ct. 1924); Kenning v. Interurban Railway &
Terminal Co., 18 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 526 (Cincinnati Super. Ct. 1915); Biddinger v.
Stesninger-Taylor Co., 18 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 42 (Hardin Com. Pl. 1915); Vayto v.
River Terminal & Ry., 18 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 305, 28 Ohio Dec. 401 (Cuyahoga
Com. Pl. 1915).
'44 Ohio App. 475, 186 N.E. 372 (1933).
11Id. at 481, 186 N.E. at 374.
19531
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
injuries predicated upon common law negligence," the third person can
avail himself of the usual defenses in such an action,' 2 but the employee's
right to recover is not affected by any negligence on the part of his em-
ployer contributing to the injury, so long as the injury was the direct and
proximate result of the third person's negligence.' 3
Various rationales are given by the Ohio courts as to why the injured em-
ployee can recover from the negligent third person even though he has also
a right to compensation. In the Shachovsky case, the supreme court reasoned
that the third person had no contractual relation with the employee, that
the third person was a total stranger, and hence he cannot contend" that
it is inequitable to allow the workman to have two recoveries, one under the
Compensation Act and one under this suit."' 4 Perhaps a better statement is
that the Workmen's Compensation statutes relate solely to the relationship
of employer and employee,' and the Act does not change the nature or
existence of the cause of action against the third person." A lower Ohio
court said there was no provision in the Act making the remedy therein
provided against the employer exclusive." Still other courts have decided
that there is, in actuality, no double recovery, for the compensation awarded
under the Act is not full or complete and its amount can be later changed or
modified.'"
There is one instance, however, when the injured employee cannot re-
cover from the negligent third person. This occurs when the third person
and the injured man are employees 9 of the same employer. In the leading
'Hartford Acc. & Indemnity Co. v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 91 Ohio App. 573, 109
N.E.2d 287 (1952).
' Kasunic v. Euclid East Seventeenth Street Co., 32 Ohio L. Rep. 261 (Ohio App.
1929) (contributory negligence)
'Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Cedar Valley Elec. Co., 187 Iowa 1014, 174 N.W 709
(1919)
'
4Trumbull Cliffs Furnace Co. v. Shachovsky, 111 Ohio St. 791, 796, 146 N.E. 306,
308 (1924).
'George v. Youngstown, 139 Ohio St. 591, 41 N.E.2d 567 (1942); Hartford Acc.
& Indemnity Co. v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 91 Ohio App. 573, 109 N.E.2d 287
(1952).
"Hartford Acc. & Indemnity Co. v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 91 Ohio App. 573, 577,
109 N.E.2d 287, 289 (1952)
"Ohio Traction Co. v. Washington, 6 Ohio App. 273 (1916) The court added
that the rule that settlement with one joint tortfeasor is a bar to recovery from the
other has no application and cannot be invoked in such a case.
"Kenning v. Interurban Railway & Terminal Co., 18 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 526 (Cin-
cinnati Super. Ct. 1915); Vayto v. River Terminal & Ry., 18 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 305,
28 Ohio Dec. 401 (Cuyahoga Com. Pl. 1915)
" The third person cannot get immunity from the fact that he is a shareholder in the
corporate employer; the separate entity concept is recognized. Landrum v. Middaugh,
117 Ohio St. 608, 160 N.E. 691 (1927)
NOTES
case of Landrum v. Middaugh,20 an employee was injured by a negligent act
of his foreman, performed in the regular course of the foreman's employ-
ment, while both the employee and his foreman were working for an em-
ployer who had complied with the Act. In an action for personal injuries
against the foreman, the court denied recovery on the ground that the acts
of the foreman were the acts of the employer, and since the employer was
immune from common law suits under the Ohio Constitution, 21 the fore-
man was also. A third person who is not an employee of the same em-
ployer is liable because the employer has no control over his acts. In other
words, the fellow-employee causing the injury is not a true third person.
Such "immunity" reasoning implies that if both employees worked for a
common employer who had not complied with the Act, the injured em-
ployee could elect 2  to sue his fellow-employee at common law, for the em-
ployer would have no immunity from such a suit that could be extended to
the negligent employee.
23
In a dictum, the court in the Landrum case said that "if the foreman
willfully, maliciously, or wantonly, in the pursuance of his own unlawful
purpose, injures a fellow employee, his act is not that of the employer.' 24 As
a result one might be led to the conclusion that the employee would be
liable. But in Rosenberger v. L'Archer,25 which was an action by an em-
ployee whose employer had complied with the Act to recover damages from
the manager of the employer's business for alleged wanton negligence while
plaintiff and the manager were driving in the employer's car on company
business, the plaintiff relied on the dictum in the Landrum case. The court
of appeals reversed a judgment for the plaintiff, and entered final judg-
ment for the defendant after holding that there was no evidence of the
manager's willful or wanton negligence. The court explained the dictum in
the Landrum case by stating, " the judge had in mind a case in which it
appeared that the blameworthy employee was acting 'in pursuance of his
own unlawful purposes' and not in pursuance of the purposes -lawful or
unlawful- of his employer." 20 Under the former circumstances, the court
continued, the employer would not be liable at common law because the
employee would no longer be acting within the scope of his employment;
' 117 Ohio St. 608, 160 N.E. 691 (1927).
2 Article II, § 35.
" When an employer has failed to comply with the Act, his injured employee may
elect to sue him at common law or to file a claim with the Industrial Commission for
compensation. OHIO REV. CODE §§ 4123.77, 4123.75 (Omio GEN. CODE §§
1465-73, 1465-74.)
' Gallick v. Ott, 39 Ohio L. Abs. 38, 51 N.E.2d 404 (Ohio App. 1940) semble.
'Landrum v. Middaugh, 117 Ohio St. 608, 615, 160 N.E. 691, 693 (1927)
' 30 Ohio L. Abs. 552, 31 N.E.2d 700 (Ohio App. 1936).
"Id. at 554, 31 N.E.2d at 702.
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there would be no relation of employer-employee, and it is only to that
relation which the Act applies. But where only wanton negligence is
charged, the plaintiff would have no common law cause of action against the
employer, being relegated to his remedy under the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act because "the degree of the negligence could not affect the question
of whether the injury resulted from a hazard of the business in which
[the employee] was engaged,"27 and there could therefore be no re-
covery from the tortfeasor-employee.
The holding of the Landrum case has been weakened by a later supreme
court decision, Morrow v. Hume.21 In this case, the defendant was vice-
president and general manager in charge of sales for a corporation, and the
plaintiff's decedent was a salesman for the same corporation. The plaintiff
and the defendant were sent to interview a prospective purchaser in De-
troit, and, acting under their employer's authority and directions, they went
in defendant's car, with defendant driving. They were involved in an
automobile accident. Plaintiff collected compensation under the Act, and
then sued the defendant for negligence [the accident occurred before the
Ohio "guest statute" was enacted]. The defendant relied on the fact that the
plaintiff had collected compensation as a defense, per the Landrum case, but
the court held that plaintiff could recover nevertheless. Although defendant
was acting under the employer's authority and direction and in furtherance
of the employer's business," no facts [were] alleged which show
that the employer had any power or right to direct the operation and control
of the automobile.""9  The court reasoned that in the Landrm case the
foreman who started the machinery which crushed the employee's arm was
the alter-ego of the employer in the operation of the employer's machinery,
but that here the defendant was in a different position because he was
operating and controlling his own car. 'This distinction by the court in the
Morrow case seems at best a weak one, for in neither case did the employer
have actual physical control over his employee, and the fact that an em-
ployee is driving his own car, rather than the employer's, does not materially
lessen the control the employer has over nim as a result of the employment
relationship?0°
The fact that the third person is a doctor who treated the plaintiff for his
injury is no basis for a distinction from the rule laid down in the Landrum
Mid. at 554, 31 N.E.2d at 701.
' 131 Ohio St. 319, 3 N.E.2d 39 (1936)
Id. at 326, 3 N.E.2d at 42.
' See Rosenberger v. L'Archer, 30 Ohio L. Abs. 552, 31 N.E.2d 700 (Ohio App.
1936), where recovery was denied in a suit against an employee. Here the injuries
were the result of an accident caused by the alleged negligence of the defendant while
he was driving the common employer s car. The court put no emphasis on the fact
[Fall
NOTES
case. If the plaintiff hires an independent doctor to treat him and the doc-
tor is guilty of malpractice, the plaintiff can recover from the doctor even
though he is receiving increased compensation for the aggravated injury;3'
but if the plaintiff's injuries are aggravated by a doctor in the employ of the
plaintiff's employer, the plaintiff cannot recover in an action against the
doctor, even though he has not applied for additional compensation
m 2
The problem of the amount of damages recoverable from the third
person by the injured employee who was receiving benefits under the Act
has troubled the courts. Prior to 1927 sdveral lower courts had held that
the compensation recovered under the Act could not be pleaded by the third
person in mitigation of damages in a suit against such third person by the
employee.33 But in that year Ohio Public Service Co. v. Sharkey,3 4 the first
supreme court case dealing expressly with this problem,35 held that recovery
in an action against the negligent third person could only be pro tanto, and
only for such portion of the damages as had not been compensated for
under the Workman's Compensation Act, on the ground that:
the common law doctrine that it is inequitable to allow a double satisfac-
non for the same injury was not abrogated, either expressly or impliedly,
by the Workman's Compensation Act , the purpose of which is to in-
sure to workmen injured during their employment the compensation
precisely commensurate with the injury.U
However, the question was raised again in the subsequent case of Truscon
Steel Co. v. Trumbull Cliffs Furnace Co., in which the supreme court ex-
pressly overruled its earlier holding and allowed full recovery by the in-
jured employee from the negligent third person. This has remained the
law in Ohio to the present time.38 The courts' rationale is that the allowance
of compensation under the Act is in the nature of occupational insurance
that the car was the employer's; on the contrary, it stressed that the defendant was
acting in pursuance of the employer's purposes.
"Thackery v. Helfrich, 5 Ohio L Abs. 396 (Ohio App. 1927).
'Anderson v. Libby Glass Mfg. Co., 6 Ohio L. Abs. 400 (Ohio App. 1928).
' Thackery v. Helfrich, 5 Ohio L. Abs. 396 (Ohio App. 1927); Luthy v. Cincinnati,
N.Y. & Tex. P. Ry., 2 Ohio L Abs. 207 (Cincinnati Super. Ct. 1924); Brunk v.
Cleveland, C., C. & S.L. Ry., 20 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 360 (Clark Com. P1. 1918).
= 117 Ohio St. 586, 160 N.E. 687 (1927).
= The issue of the amount of recovery was not raised in Trumbull Cliffs Furnace Co.
v. Shachovsky, 111 Ohio St. 791, 146 N.E. 306 (1924).
"Ohio Pub. Service Co. v. Sharkey, 117 Ohio St. 586,'598, 160 N.E. 687, 690
(1927); accord, Arnold v. Ohio Gas & Elec. Co., 28 Ohio App. 435, 162 N.E. 765
(1928).
1120 Ohio St. 394, 166 N.E. 368 (1929). See Note 48, snfra.
'Overland Construction Co. v. Sydnor, 70 F.2d 338 (6th Cir. 1934); Pappas v.
Baltimore & 0. Ry., 37 F.2d 271 (6th Cir. 1930); McDowell v. Rockey, 32 Ohio
App. 26, 167 N.E. 589 (1929).
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and hence cannot be deducted and treated as an offset to a claim for dam-
ages.39
When the problem of whether the two-year ° or the six-year41 statute
of limitations applies to the injured employee's cause of action against the
negligent third person arose, Hartford Acc. & Indemnty Co. v. Proctor &
Gamble Co.,,2 the only Ohio case on the problem, decided that the two-
year statute is applicable, " for the reason that the cause of action is for
personal injuries predicated upon common law negligence."4 3 In this case,
the plaintiff became the assignee of the injured employee's claim by virtue
of a New York statute,44 but the court applied Ohio adjective law. Which
statute of limitations applied depended upon whether plaintiff's right to
sue was a common law right to sue for personal injuries arising out of tort
or was a right to sue upon a liability created by statute. The court held that
although plaintiff became the employee's assignee because of the New York
statute, it merely stood in the employee's shoes, and the latter's cause of
action existed independently of the statute as a common law right to re-
cover for personal injuries. Therefore, since the Workmen's Compensation
statutes do not change the nature of the cause of action, the two-year statute is
applicable.
As noted previously, the negligent third person is liable to the injured
employee; the question then arises whether the third person may also be
liable to the employer of the injured employee. The leading case on this
problem is Truscon Steel Co. v. Trumbull Cliffs Furnace Co."5 Here the
plaintiff was a self-insurer which had paid its employee $2800 for injuries
received as a result of the third party-defendant's negligence. The defendant
had been sued by the employee and had, as the result of adverse judgment,48
'McDowell v. Rockey, 32 Ohio App. 26, 167 N.E. 589 (1929); Thackery v. Hel-
frich, 5 Ohio L. Abs. 396 (Ohio App. 1927); Brunk v. Cleveland, C., C. & S.L Ry.,
20 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 360 (Clark Com. Pl. 1918); cf. Dietrich v. Peters, 28 Ohio
App. 427, 162 N.E. 753 (1928); Shields v. Cincinnati Traction Co., 13 Ohio N.P
(N.S.) 133, 24 Ohio Dec. 253 (Hamilton Com. Pl. 1911); Pittsburgh, C. & S.L.
Ry. v. Fagin, 3 Ohio N.P (N.S.) 30, 15 Ohio Dec. 605 (Cincinnati Super. Ct.
1905), af'd, 74 Ohio St. 491, 18 N.E. 1135 (1906) McCoRMicK, DAMAGES
323 (1935).
'091 Ohio App. 573, 109 N.E.2d 287 (1952)
" "An action for bodily injury shall be brought within two years after the cause
thereof arose." OHIo REV. CODE § 2305.10 (OHIo GEN. CODE § 11224-1).
4291 Ohio App. 573, 577, 109 N.E.2d 287, 289 (1952).
43N.Y. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 29.
" "An action upon a liability created by statute other than a forfeiture or penalty,
shall be brought within six years after the cause thereof accured." OHIO REV. CODE
§ 2305.07 (OHIO GEN. CODE § 11222)
" 120 Ohio St. 394, 166 N.E. 368 (1929).
"Trumbull Cliffs Furnace Co. v. Shachovsky, 111 Ohio St. 791, 146 N.E. 306
(1924).
NOTES
paid him $10,000. Here the plaintiff-employer sought to recover from the
negligent third party the $2800 it had paid as compensation to its em-
ployee. The court demed recovery, relying on the provision 7 of the Ohio
Workmen's Compensation Act which declares indemnity contracts to be
void. The court said:
Nothing could be clearer than that the legislature, by the provisions
of this section, indicated its intention to prevent the reimbursement of the
employer for any amount paid pursuant to the provisions of the Work-
men's Compensation Act to an injured employee. . In some of the states
the Workmen's Compensation Act recognizes the right of re:mbursement
where there has been a full recovery in a direct suit against a third person
whose negligence was the cause of the injury, but nothing of that kind
appears in the Workmen's Compensation Act of Ohio.
The same rule was followed in a later case,49 and it would seem to be in
accord with the general principle in insurance cases that there is no subro-
gation of the insurer on an accident or life policy to the claim of the in-
sured against the one who injured or killed him.5 0 Ohio's Act contains no
provision for the subrogation of the employer to his employee's rights, and
hence the employee, and not the employer, can recover the fuil amount from
the negligent third person.5
But there are, nevertheless, occasions when the employer can recover
from the negligent third person, namely, where the negligence of the third
person constitutes a breach of a contract he has made with the injured man's
employer. Thus, in Midvale Coal Co. v. Cardox Corp.,52 one of the plain-
tiffs employees was injured by an explosion due to the defendant's failure
to inspect and service a blasting cartridge as required the the terms of a
contract between the plaintiff and the defendant. The employee was awarded
'
TOio REv. CODE § 4123.82 (OHIO GEN. CODE § 1465-101).
"120 Ohio St. 394, 397-399, 166 N.E. 368, 369 (1929). Ohio Revised Code
Section 4123.82(b) [Ohio General Code Section 1465-101(b)I was amended in
1951. The court also felt that this decision was "irreconciliable on principle," Id. at
399, 166 N.E. at 369, with the pro tanto theory of recovery of Ohio Pub. Service Co.
v. Sharkey, 117 Ohio St 586, 160 N.E. 687 (1927), and so overruled that theory.
" Cleveland, Columbus & Cincinnati Highway, Inc. v. Bookmyer, 67 Olo App.
476, 37 N.E.2d 393 (1941).
'
0Mercer Cas. Co. v. Perlman, 62 Ohio App. 133, 23 NXE.2d 502 (1939); Gatzweiler
v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Light Co., 136 Wis. 34, 116 N.W 633 (1908). VANCE,
INSURANCE 796-797 (3d ed, 1951).
iiHerbruck v. Burger Iron Co., 44 Ohio App. 475, 186 N.E. 372 (1933); Vayto v.
River Terminal & Railway Co., 18 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 305, 268 Ohio Dec. 401 (Cuya-
hoga Com. P1. 1915). "While it has been held that the subrogation provisions of
the various Acts are merely declaratory of the common law rule and subrogation
would be available to the employer regardless of such provision of the Acts, it
has also been held that without such provision in toe Acts the employer would
have no subrogation rights." 3 SCHNEIDER, WORKMAN'S COMPENSATION 179
(3d ed. 1943).
' 157 Ohio St. 526, 106 N.E.2d 556 (1952).
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compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, and as a result the
plaintiff's premiums to the insurance fund were increased under the merit-
rating system. 3 The plaintiff sought to recover from me defendant the
total sum of the additional premiums it had to pay. The court held it could
recover in an action for breach of contract, because the damages resulting
from the breach were not too remote to be recoverable. By this decision the
Truscon case was expressly limited to its facts. However, the total amount
of such damages could not exceed the total sum awarded and paid as a re-
sult of the employee's injuries, because "the parties did not contemplate
premiums in excess thereof due to accident experience and increased pay-
rolls."54
A similar decision was reached in Bitner v'. Boyajohn & Barr, Inc.55
Here the plaintiff, a sub-contractor, sued the defendant, the principal con-
tractor, for a balance due. The plaintiff and the defendant had had a con-
tract wherein the plaintiff agreed to carry workmen's compensation and
protect the defendant from loss or liability on account of any accidents or
damage. The Defendant loaned the plaintiff an employee, who was injured
and collected workmen's compensation by reason of the protection grow-
ing out of his employment by the defendant. The plaintiff had not com-
plied with the Workmen's Compensation Act, in violation of its contract,
and because of the compersation paid to the defendant's employee, the de-
fendant was required to pay an increased rate of premium into the Work-
men's Compensation fund. The defendant counter-claimed to recover this
increased amount from plaintiff, and the court affirmed a judgment for the
defendant-employer on the ground that the damages flowed from a violation
of the terms of the contract. It may therefore be seen that employers may
be protected5- to some extent from increased premiums by proper provisions
in their contracts with others.
In conclusion, it may be said that the law in Ohio regarding the liability
of third persons under the Workmen's Compensation Act fully supports
the observation that:
the feeling of many lawyers that the mere existence of a compensation
act wipes out common law suits is not justified by the cases; and the law-
yer is still needed to protect and enforce those rights- common law and
statutory- which the compensation act does not abolish or effect"
HERBERT B. LEvINE
OHIO REv. CoDE § 4123.34 [OHio GEN. CODE § 1465-54(3)1.
157 Ohio St. 526, 531, 106 N.E.2d 556, 559-650 (1952).
19 Ohio L. Abs. 325 (Ohio App. 1935)
'Accord, American 10ut. Liability Ins. Co. v. United States Elec. Tool Co., 55 Ohio
App. 107, 9 N.E.2d 157 (1936).
" HoRovrrz, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATiON 353 (1944).
